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"Interest Organizations and European Union Politics" published on by Oxford University Press.

Interest representation plays a systemic role in EU policy making and integration, recognised as such in the Treaty on European Union. Interest organisations supply technical and political information to the EU institutions, and EU institutions use interest organisations as agents of political communication. Interest organisations act as a proxy for an otherwise largely absent civil society, with a teeming population of groups advocating for every imaginable cause. Where groups are absent, so EU institutions have stimulated their formation. The result is a pluralist system of checks and balances, although the literature includes findings of 'islands' resembling corporatist practice. EU institutions have designed a range of procedures in support of 'an open and structured dialogue between the Commission and special interest groups,' now largely packaged as a 'Better Regulation' programme. Measures include funding for NGOs, consultation procedures accompanied by impact assessments, a Transparency Register to provide lobbying transparency, and measures for access to documents that enable civil society organisations to keep EU institutions accountable. A multi-level governance system further strengthens pluralist design, making it impossible for any one type of interest to routinely capture the diversity of EU decision making. A key controversy in the literature is how to assess influence, and whether lobbying success varies across interest group type. EU public policy making is regulatory, making for competitive interest group politics, often between different branches of business whose interests are affected differently by regulatory proposals. There are striking findings from the literature, including that NGOs are more successful than business organisations in getting what they want from EU public policy making, particularly where issues reach the status of high salience where they attract the attention of the European Parliament. A key innovation of the Lisbon Treaty involves a European Citizens' Initiative, ...

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE FORMATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE NEW GERMAN LANDER. IN THE CASE OF THE ECONOMIC INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS (EMPLOYERS AND INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS), THE INITIATIVE CAME LARGELY FROM THE WEST. ALTHOUGH FORMAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES WERE QUICKLY PUT IN PLACE, LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION REMAINED RELATIVELY LOW. THE RESULTANT WEAKNESS IN TERMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES PERPETUATED DEPENDENCY UPON COUNTERPARTS IN THE WEST. A CASE STUDY ON THE FORMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EAST SHOWS THAT THE INITIAL DYNAMISM IN THIS SECTOR HAS GIVEN WAY TO STAGNATION AND FRAGMENTATION. THIS IS SYMPTOMATIC OF THE APPARENT INABILITY OF THE NEW LANDER TO SUSTAIN THE AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY NORMALLY ASSOCIATED WITH A PLURALIST CIVIL SOCIETY.

Are there institutional forms of interest organization most conducive to cooperative labor relations, collective conflict regulation, and economic performance? What elements of association infrastructure make for more effective economic systems and less social disintegration than has been experienced in advanced industrial societies for over a decade? In focusing on intermediary interest associations, recent debates touch on crises of developed capitalism and liberal pluralism theory. Analyzing interest organization may be more illuminating if we understand those contexts that make organizing interests a problem at all.

The number of interest organizations (density) varies across policy domains, political issues and economic sectors. This shapes the nature and outcomes of interest representation. In this contribution, we explain the density of interest organizations per economic sector in the European Union on the basis of political and economic institutional factors. Focusing on business interest representation, we show that economic institutions structure the 'supply' of interest organizations by affecting the number of potential constituents, the resources available for lobbying and the geographical level of collective action of businesses. In contrast, we do not find consistent evidence that political institutions produce 'demand' for interest organizations by making laws, developing public policy or spending money. This is in contrast to the extensive evidence that such factors affect lobbying practices. The European Union interest system is (partially) shaped by economic factors, relatively independent from public policy or institutions.

The main issue discussed is the difficulties in collective action. Three logics of collective action are identified and discussed in terms of their implications for solidarity within interest organizations and for organizational action. Both solidarity and organizational action are important for successful policymaking. Policies can be decided without the support of the members, but their implementation may thus prove difficult. The theoretical issue of interest articulation by interest organizations is the important one here. The article concludes that encompassing organizations will most likely have difficulty in articulating a definite organizational policy. It is maintained that corporatism and public responsibility‐taking can severely hamper the articulation of organized special interests. They lead to interest inarticulation. This may lead to legitimacy problems for the organization and be one explanation for the recent decline in certain established interest organizations in Sweden and recent discussions on the future of corporatism.

Political scientists have always accorded interest organizations a prominent place in European Union (EU) policy-making because they connect the EU institutions to citizens, provide important information to EU policy-makers, and control resources that impact on the problem-solving capacity of EU policies. In other words, they are vital to both the input legitimacy and the output legitimacy of the EU. So far, research on interest organizations in EU policy-making has concentrated on EU-level interest organizations and EU-level politics. This edited book draws attention to the role national interest organizations play in the EU multilevel system. All contributions present state-of-the-art research on that subject in the form of theory-driven empirical analyses.